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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HAL E. HOLMSTEAD 
' 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12257 
This is an action against an employer to recover 
damages for injuries allegedly sustained in a collision 
in which an employee of the employer was involved. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-appellant's (hereinafter referred to as 
defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment was denied 
by the trial court. This Court granted defendant's 
petition for intermediate appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a determination by this Court that 
the covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff-respondent 
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') ... 
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) in favor of defend-
ant's employee is a bar to the claim against the employer. 
STATEMENrr OF FACTS 
The facts are simple and undisputed. This suit 
arises out of an accident which occurred December 6 
I 
1968, at the intersection of Lehi Main Street and the 
frontage road to I-15 near Lehi in Utah County, Utah. 
A vehicle owned and driven by plaintiff collided with a 
vehicle owned and driven by one Gideon Allen. At the 
time and place of the accident Gideon Allen was an agent 
and employee of the defendant, Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 
operating his said vehicle and acting within the scopB of 
his employment. Plaintiff therefore seeks to hold defend-
ant liable under the doctrine of master and servant or 
respondeat superior. No independant or active negli-
gence is alleged on the part of Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. 
Suit was commenced by filing of the Complaint on 
April 17, 1969 (R. 3) and Summons was served April 
18, 1969 (R. 5). The employee Gideon Allen was not and 
has not been named as a party to this action. 
On July 7, 1969 in consideration of the payment in 
behalf of said Gideon Allen of $10,000, plaintiff executed 
and delivered a simple covenant not to sue in which he 
d or did "covenant and agrre never to make any deman 
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claim, or commence or cause or permit to be prosecuted 
any action at law or in equity, or any proceeding of any 
description, against Gideon Allen because of personal 
injnry, disability, property damage, loss of services, 
expense or loss of any kind ... sustained ... in conse-
quence of an accident that occurred on or about the 6th 
clay of December, 1968 at or near Lehi, Utah." (R. 31.) 
On October 29, 1970 Abbott GM Diesel Inc. filed 
' a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the plead-
ings, depositions and records on file and an affidavit of 
Reed L. Martineau, which showed the undisputed facts 
as set out above (R. 27-31). 
Following four hearings on November 14, 1969 (R. 
46), December 12, 1969 (R. 47), December 19, 1969 (R. 
51) and January 2, 1970 (R. 54) on the Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, the plantiffs in January, 1970, inde-
pendently commenced an action in the District Court of 
Utah County, Utah against Gideon Allen and Allstate In-
snrance Company for reformation of the covenant not to 
:sne dated July 7, 1969. Defendant Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. 
was not made a party to that action even though its in-
terest was known to plaintiff's counsel. A Decree of Re-
formation ,ms entered upon the default of Gideon Allen 
and Allstah~ Insurance Company on March 11, 1970 (R. 
32-34). By the Decree of Reformation the following para-
graph was added to the covenant not to sue, which other-
wis0 was left unchanged: 
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"I hereby reserve all of my rights against 
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., including my right to 
pursue the lawsuit which was filed in the District 
Court of Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, on the 17th day of April ' 
1969, entitled Hal E. Holmstead vs. Abbott mr 
Diesel, Inc., Civil No. 33,121." 
Both parties filed written memorandums in support 
of their respective positions with the lower court, and on 
September 18, 1970 District Judge Joseph E. Nelson 
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 61). 
Defendant thereupon filed its petition for intermediate 




THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE IN FAVOR OF 
AGENT, GIDEON ALLEN OPERATES AS A RE-
LEASE OF THE EMPLOYER WHOSE LIABILITY, 
IF ANY, IS WHOLLY DERIVATIVE. 
It is clear that the liability here sought to be fastened 
upon appellant is purely derivative under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior. The alleged negligence is that 
of the agent. The employer's liability, if any, must arise 
· . · no solely because of the, employment relationship smce 
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5 
active or independent negligence on the part of the em-
ployPr is or conld be shown undPr the facts here involved. 
Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 2GG, 159 P.2d 149 
(1945); 53 Am. J ur. 2d 41G, Master & Sen ant ~408. 
Cases which have considered the precise question 
here involved have held that 1vhere liability of a master 
or principal for a tort committed by his servant or agent 
arisPs solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
the injured person's covenant not to sue the servant 
or agent operates to release the master or principal from 
liability. Annotation, Release of (or Covenant Not to 
Sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant 
or agent for tort, or vice versa, 92 ALR 2d 533, Section 
7, p. 552-555, as supplemented in ALR 2d Later Case 
Service. 
In Holcomb vs. Flavin, 216 N.E. 2d 811 (Ill. 19GG), 
a case very similar factually to the present case, the 
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a covenant not to 
sue the agent, in which no mention was made of the em-
ployer, was a bar to the injured party's claims against 
the employer. The court's opinion in that case rn 
instructive here, so is quoted at some length. 
"The covenant herein is a standard covenant 
not to sue containing no reservations of rights 
againt others and provides that 'this instrument 
is and shall be construed as a cownant not to 
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~ue as di_stinguished from a release.' No mention 
is made m the covenant of the defendants in this 
suit. 
"'l1lie appellate court specifically rejected tlit· 
view recognized by a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions. In those cases the courts, although 
recognizing the distinction between a release and 
a covenant not to sue as applied to joint tort-
feasors generally, have taken the view that where 
the only liability of master or principal arises 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the 
injured person's covenant not to sue the servant 
operates to release the master or principal from 
liability. The rationale of these cases is based 
either upon the theory that such a result will 
avoid circuity of action or that since the liability 
of the master or principal is merely derivative 
and secondary, exoneration of the servant 
removes the foundation upon which to impute 
negligence to the master or principal. Anno: 92 
A.L.R. 2d 552, et seq. 
"A leading case on the subject is Karcher v:;. 
Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E. 2d 542, 124 
A.L.R. 1292, where the court stated: 
'The Company's (employer's) liability is 
of a derivative or secondary character, rest-
.in er solely u1Jon the doctri~e of respondeat 
b • 
superior. Panglntrn vs. Buick 111 otor Co., 
211 N.Y. 228, 234, 103 N.E. 423. The com-
pany was, in effect, the plaintiff's (em-
ployee's) surety, and could, therefore, 
recover over against him if compellPd to pay 
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damages for his negligence while he was 
acting .as its agent within the scope of his 
authority. Kramer vs. Morgan, 2d Cir. 85 
F.2d 96. See Pittsley vs. Allen (297 Mass. 
33), 7 N .E. 2d 442. It is a principle of the 
law of suretyship that a release or covenant 
not to sue the person known by the coven-
antor to be the principal will discharge the 
surety.' 
"A similar view was taken by the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Bacon vs. 
United States, 321 F. 2d 880, where the court 
stated: 
'As the Missouri Supreme Court said in 
Max, (Max vs. Spaeth, 349 S.W. 2d 1) the 
master's liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is based not on his own 
misdeeds but those of his servant, and "there-
fore, when the servant is not liable, the 
master for whom he was acting at the time 
should not be liable." It matters little how 
the servant was released from liability; as 
long as he is free from harm, it appears to 
us that his master should also be blameless' 
(covenant not to sue executed by tort victim 
in favor of servant tort-feasor). 
"In Stewart vs. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W. 
2d 671, the court in a similar situation involving 
a covenant not to sne the servant pointed out 
that if a judgment were obtained against the 
employer based upon the employee's negligence, 
the employer ·would be entitled to sue the em-
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p~oyee and ob~ain the same judgment against hirn. 
Smee the plamtiff had given the employee the 
covenant not to sue, the employee would be then 
entitled to judgment against the plaintiff as wa~ 
originally obtained in the action against the em. 
ployee, thus completing the circuit and the partie~ 
would come out in the same position as when the1 
started. The court, therefore, held that a cove1;. 
ant not to sue the servant extinguishes the cause 
of action against the wrong-doer and therefore 
extinguishes the cause of action against his 
superior. 
"See also Land vs. United States (D.C. Oki.), 
231 F. Supp. 383, 385; Max vs. Speath (Mo. 
Supp.), 349 S.W. 2d 1, 6; Jacobson vs. Parrill, 186 
Kan. 467, 351 P.2d 194, 196; Barsh vs. Mullins 
(Okl.), 338 P. 2d 845, 848; Bergeron vs. Giffort-
H ill (Ga.), 137 So. 2d 63 ; Carnal Insurance Co. 
vs. W.ascom (La. App.), 148 So. 2d 89, 90; Smith 
vs. South and Western R. Co., 151 N.C. 479, 60 
SE. 435; Kelly vs. Ford Motor Company, 104 Ohio 
App.185, 139 N.E. 2d 99. 
"In the case at bar the trial court recognized 
that if the defendants would have to respond 
in damages, they could sue their alleged employee. 
the covenantee, for the amount they had to pay. 
The employee would then have to respond in the 
very damages which the covenant was supposed 
to guard against. ri~he contrary result reached by 
the appellate court herein vmuld certainly in·. 
volve an undesirable circuity and multiplicity ol 
actions. 
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"The appellate court stated that when Barnard 
paid for the covenant, he is presumed to know 
that if_ the plaintiff recovered from his employers 
they, m turn, would seek indemnity from him. 
Considering the conflict in the cases we do not 
believe that the appellate court could fairly in-
dulge in such a presumption. If the appellate 
court conclusion is correct, there is a serious 
question as to what Barnard got for his $16,000, 
for he certainly did not buy his peace if he may 
still ultimately be liable to, his employer. We 
believe a more logical and satisfactory result 
is reached by our holding in accordance with the 
majority view, that the covenant not to sue the 
servant or agent releases the master or principal 
and we so hold. In line with the cases hereinbefore 
cited a circuity of action will be avoided and 
since the liability of the master or principal is 
merely derivative and secondary, the exoneration 
of the servant or agent prevents the imputing of 
negligence to the master or principal." 
The holding of the Holcomb case was reaffirmed in 
American Nat. B. & T. Co. vs. Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co., 238 N.E. 2d 385 (Ill. 1968), where the Illinois Su-
preme Court stated: 
"As in the Holcomb case the plaintiff settled 
his case based on the Milwaukee's negligence for 
$75,000.00 and executed a covenant not to ~nfor~e 
the judgment against it. The covenant i~ tlus 
case must operate just as the covenant m the 
H olcornb case. *** The relationship between the 
defendants and the Milwaukee in this suit, there-
fore is IJreciselv the same as that between the ' . 
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10 
driver and his employers in the Holcomb case. 
The sole issue before this court is whether t]1p 
execution of a covenant not to enforce the judg-
ment against an agent or servant operates to ex-
tinguish a claim against the principal or master, 
whose liability, if any, arises under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. The answer must be in the 
affirmative." 
In the case of Stewart vs. Craig, 344 S.W. 2d 761 
(Tenn. 1961), cited in the Holcomb case, the injured varty, 
in consideration of the payment on behalf of the agent 
of $16,000.00, executed a covenant not to sue. In a suit 
subsequently brought against the employer the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee held, as noted in the H olcomu case, 
that a covenant not to sue the servant extinguished the 
cause of action against the master. 
In Simpson vs. Townsley, 283 F. 2d 743, (10th cir. 
1960), 92 A.L.R. 2d 526, the plaintiff was injured in an 
automobile accident which was alleged to have resulted 
from the negligence of the agent, servant or employee of 
the defendant employer. The plaintiff, in com;ideration 
of the payment on behalf of the agent of $10,000.00, 
executed and delivered a covenant not to sne the agent. 
Thereafter suit was filed against the employer, hased 
upon the alleged negligence of the agent. A motion for 
summary J·udament on behalf of the defendant was 
• b 
granted and on appeal it was snstaine<l. The 'l1enth 
Circuit Court of Appeals tlwn· not<•d: 
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''It is clear that Simpson's allecred cause of 
actioi: is ba.sed on the doctrine of respondeat 
snpenor. His complaint contains no allecrations 
of. negligence on t~ie part of the r:rribune p~rtner­
sl11p, or corpornt10n, of Goldenbelt. Rather, it 
alkges that 'the negligence of Meda Oneida 
Smith is likc,wise the n<>gljgence of tlw def Pnd-
anh; ... ' 
"Under the law of Kansas there is no 
distinction between the liability of a principal for 
the tortious acts of his agent and the liability of 
a master for the tortious acts of his servant. In 
hoth relationships the liability is grounded upon 
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under that 
doctrine the liability of the master to a third per-
son for injuries inflicted by a servant in the 
course of his employment is derivative and 
secondary and that of the servant is primary. 
\¥here the liability of the master is not predicated 
on any delict on his part, but solely on his second-
ary liability under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, the exoneration of the servant removes 
the foundation upon which to impute negligence 
to the master. 
"Moreover, nnder the law of Kansas, while a 
master whose liability is predicated solely on the 
doctrine of respondeat superior and not on any 
wrong on his part ma>- be sued jointly with his 
sPrvai1t for a tort committed by the latter within 
the scope of his employment, they are not joint 
tort f easors in the sense they are equal wrong-
do('l'S. \:Vherc a master becomes liable to a third 
person for personal injuries caused solel>' by the 
act of 11is servant, nnder the doctrine of respond-
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12 
ea~ superior, a~d is required to respond to such 
third person m damages by reason of such 
liability, he 'vill be subrogated to tlw rights of 
the injured third person and may recover over 
from his servant who is primarily liable. ln 
distinguishing the nature of the liability of the 
servant and of the master, in Jacobson vs. Parrill, 
186 Kan. 4G7, 351 P. :2d 194, 199, the Kansa~ 
Supreme Court said: 
'Basically, there is no distinction to Le 
drawn between the liability of the principal 
for the tortious acts of his agent and tlte 
liability of a master for the tortious acb 
of his servant. \iVhile reference here i~ 
made only to the relation of master and 
servant, it also pertains to the relation of 
principal and agent. In either instance, the 
liability is grounded upon the doctrine of 
respondeat superior (2 Am. Jur, Agency,~ 
359, p. 278; 77 CJS Respondeat Superior 
pp. 317-320). It has been held that under 
that doctrine the liability of the master to 
a third person for injuries inflicted by a 
servant in the course of his employment and 
within thP scope of his authority, is deri-
vative and secondary, while that of the 
servant is primary, ~nd aLsent any delict 
of the master other than thrnngh the st>r-
vant the exoneration of the servant re-
' moves tlw foundation upon which to impute 
negligence to the matter ... '" 
In Terry t:s. Memphis 8to11r and Gravel Co., 222 F. 
2d G52 ( Gth Cir. 1955) tlw injured party for valuable 
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consideration signed a covenant not to sue the agents. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals there held: 
"Appellant, for a substantial and valuable consid-
eration, signed a covenant not to sue the truck 
owner, Sullivan, or the truck driver, Hyatt. Inas-
much as the liability alleged against the appellee 
company rested solely upon the averment that 
the truck driver was the servant or agent of the 
appellee company for whose negligence it would 
be responsible upon the principle of respondeat 
sitperior, a covenant not to sue the truck owner 
and the driver - appellee's alleged agents -
would necessarily release appellee. The case is 
clearly distinguishable from those cases in which 
a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feasor does 
not protect another joint tort-feasor from an 
action for damages brought against it by an 
injured party." 
In Karcher vs. Burbank, 21 N.E. 2d 542 (Mass, 
1939), 124 A.L.R. 1292, a covenant not to sue executed by 
the injured party in favor of the agent was held to bar 
an action against the principal. The court there stated: 
"The principal and his agent are liable in 
separate actions to a third person for the agent:s 
ne()'ligent acts cormnitted within the scope of his 
authoritv both of which actions may be pursued . ' 
until one satisfaction is obtained." 
* * ~' 
"In the case at bar if the company is chargeable 
with the negligen~e of the plaintiff, it is only 
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because his n~gligence is imputed to it by a rule 
of law; and if, because of his neglicrence the 
defendants were injured and the co~npady i~ 
compelled to pay damages, the plaintiff will be 
bound to reimburse it." 
''It is a principle of the law of smetyship that a 
release or covenant not to sue the }Jerson known 
by the covenantor to be the principal will ui~­
charge the surety.n 
"Whether or not the defendants knew of the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the com-
pany when the covenant was entered into, they 
must have known, on the record that is before ns, 
that any claim they might then have against tlw 
company on account of the plaintiff's nPgligence 
would be of a deri,·ative charactel'." 
It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the 
foregoing authorities which repre~wnt the grPat majority 
of decisions that have considered the question here in-
volved, that plaintiff's execution and dPlivery of the 
covenant not to sue the agent, Gideon Allen, operates to 
extinguish and lmr any claim against his employer. 
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. 
In plaintiff's writtc'n rnernornndtm1 filed with tl1r 
lower court it was eonfrnded that und(•r Utah law an 
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rmployer would have no right of indemnity over against 
an employee for simple negligence such as is invoked 
in the instant case (R. 41). Such right of indemnity, 
l1owen~r, is a matter of simple hornbook law as ·will be 
noted in 42 C.J.S. 89G-98, Indemnity, ~ 21, for example 
\1·hen' it is stated: 
"It is a ·well-recognized rule that an implied 
contract of indemnity arises in favor of a person 
who without any fault on his part is exposed to 
liability and compelled to pay damages on account 
of the negligence or tortious act of another, the 
former having a right of action against the latter 
for indemnity, provided they are not joint tort 
f easors in such sense as to present recovery, as 
dicussed infra Subsec. 27. This right of indemnity 
is based on the principle that everyone is respons-
ible for his own negligence, and if another person 
has been compelled by a judgment of the court 
having jurisdiction to pay the damages which 
ought to ha·ve been paid by the wrong-doer they 
mav be recovered from him. It exists independent-
ly ~f statute, and whether or not contractual rela-
tions exist between the parties, and whether or not 
the negligent person owed the other a special or 
particular legal duty not to be negligent." 
* * * 
"An agent or employee is li~ble to his princi-
pal or master for damages wh1ch the latter ·was 
compelled to pay to third persons solely because 
of the negligence or other wrongful act of the 
agent or employee; and it is no defense to th~ 
~~Prvirnt that other persons were also culpable. 
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The case of Salt Lake City -vs. Sclmbach, (Utah 
1945), 159 P.2d 149, 108 Utah 2GG, supports this general 
equitable rule that one whose negligence is passive all!! 
derivative has a right of recovery on~r against t1H~ actin 
tort-feasor. In Stewart vs. Craig, 344 S.\V. 2d 7Gl 
(Tenn., 1961), the rrennessee Supreme Court stated that: 
"The rule of law in this stafr, and universallr 
so far as we know, that where the master ( defe1;-
dants in this case) is held liable for negligent acb 
of his servant ( convenante(•) solely npon tl1P 
doctrine of rcs1w11deat superior, the master in 
turn has a causP of action against the se1Tant 
for any ~neh amount for which h(• is lwld liahle." 
The recent case of Eniployrrs' Fire I 11sitrancc Comprrn11 
vs. Welch, ct al. (N.M. 1967), 433 P.2d 79, 78 N.M. 494, 
also supports the general rul<-'. In this case the Ne\\ 
Mexico Supreme Conrt specifically held that an em-
ployer found liable on the tlwory of respondeat superior 
may recover indemnification from the employet' wh('n 
there is no active negligence on the part of such ern-
ployer. See also IIa11cock vs. Berger, cited i11f ra. 
POINT II 
THE DECREE OF REFORMATION CAN HAVE 
NO EFFECT ON THE PRESENT ACTION BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT T1IADE A PARTY TO THE 
ACTION FOR REFORMATTON. 
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It is a "\vell established principle of law that all 
persons who have a known interest must be made parties 
to any suit for reformation of an instrument in order 
to he bound by the proceedings. As stated in 45 Am. 
J ur. G42, Reformation of Instruments, Sec. 93: 
"Suits to reform written instruments are 
subject to the general rule in Chancery that all 
persons interested in the subject matter of litiga-
tion, whether it is a legal or equitable interest, 
should be made parties, so that the court may 
settle all of their rights at once and thus prevent 
the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. As a 
general rule, the ref ore, all persons to be affected 
by the proposed reformation must be made 
parties." 
This rule is salutary in its effect because courts 
should not deal lightly with the solemnly expressed 
terms of a written instrument. Much stronger and 
clearer evidence is required to permit a reformation 
than in an ordinary action for damages. See 45 Am . 
. Tur. 651, Reformation of Instruments, ~ 116. Only where 
all known interested persons are represented in the 
reformation proceeding can there be assurance that all 
relevant evidence is made available to the court, in aid 
to its decisions. 
That the employer has a recognized legal interest 
in a covenant not to sne executed in favor of the em-
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ployee tortf easor is clear from 4 Corbin on contract8 
747-48 which states: 
"An empl?yer may be liable for tortions injmy 
caused by Ins employee, solely by the doctrine 
~esp01_ideat superior, as the best method of carry-
rng nsks and compensating the injured. The 
employer may then bl~ held to have a right to full 
indemnity against the active wrongdoer. In such 
a case, settlement by which the injured party 
covenants with the active wrongdoer that he :,;hall 
not have to pay anything more on account of the 
injury migl1t be held, by analogy with contrad 
suretyship, to operate• as a complete discharge of 
the employer. 8nch should certainly he the hold-
ing, if the injured party covenants ·with the actin 
wrongdoer that he will not thereafter bring any 
action to press any claim, either against thf' 
covenantee or against anyone' else. If, in breach 
of this cov<~nant, the injnred party brings suit 
against the ernplo)·er, the latter should Jia-rr a 
d<:>fense as a third party lw1w ficiary; and thP 
co1-<.'nanke himself ~~110nld he able to enfol'C(' tlH' 
cov<->nants Rpecificall_\- l)y injnndio11.'' 
In tl1e cmw of Allrr11tic Coo:·d J.)iJ1e fl. Co. l's. Boo111', 
85 Ro. 2d 831, 57 .A.L.H. 2d 1 J~:Ci (Fla. ]!J5(i), tlw railroad 
Rnccessfnlly ass('rtc'd a J'('~<·;i_c'<' <':\Prnted L!'1 \\"e<·n the 
plaintiff and a 11cglig-1·nt dri\"('J" of nnotl:Pr a:,tornol1ik 
on tlrn theor.'' that it 1rn:-; a third 1iart,\- 1>c1wi'i('iar.1. 
- ~ . . v ·7 ". ' ' ',. ()(" 1\_ »(l (ij~. Atlrmhc ]'.,Tort11rr11.:11rl11u·s 1··-:. !Ii 11, ilnl/1( .• • 1" - - • 
12 N . .J. ::?!J~ (1:J;)~~), ~;rnil~<il . .- l10l<l 1l1at n y;i.hl n·lea:;i• 
of all clnirn:; 
, r· j] • ., . .,<·('J.<' 1~ 1 .,, •• ,;,id all ()t'l (I! J(' tl'-.•l:n ' ~'-,"'!(,_ ·' 
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pen;ons connected therewith given by the plaintiff was 
plradable as a defense by other persons not parties to 
tlte instrument. See also J. A. Leigerber, et al. vs. Scott, 
83 So. 2d 246 (Ala. S.C., 1955), where in an equity suit 
by the guardian of an incompetent for reformation of 
a clf~ccl, the court held that all persons whose interests 
in tlw subject matter, legal or equitable, who would be 
immediately or consequentially affected by the decree 
WPl'e necessary parties in a suit for reformation. 
The foregoing rule should apply with full force 
under the facts of t1w present case in which the def end-
ant's direct interest in the covenant not to sue was 
well knffwn, the covenant ha\'ing been specifically raised 
as a bar to the present suit, and in which the Decree 
of Reformation ·was thereafter ent(~red n110n defanlt 
1rithout dt'fendant having been joined as a party. Such 
deliberate disregard of defendant's vital interest in an 
att0mpt to nnilaterally circumvent the effect of the cov-
P1iant not to snr which defendant had no part in pre-
JJ<1 t·ino· or executincr cannot he r)ermitted. In order to b • b' 
lw honnd by the decrl'e, defendant mnst have heen made 
a pnrtv to the reformation snit so that it could be repre-
~Pnt(~d on the issues involnd rather than having th<~ 
1natter settled on the basis of a default. Defendant not 
having lwen made a party to the reformation suit, the 
D('(·1·ee of Reformation ran lwve no effect in the present 
(·a:.:e and should be en hre ly cli~rPgarclPd. 
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POINT III 
THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE COULD NOT 
PROPERLY BE REFORMED TO INCLUDE A 
RESERVATION NOT CONTAINED IN THE ORIG-
INAL COVENANT AS EXECUTED. 
Plaintiff's attempt to reform the covenant in the 
manner attempted in the reformation suit is invalid 
and improper. Applicable cases have so held. 
For example, in llhtse vs. DeVito, (Mass. 1923), 
137 N. E. 730 it was held that where a release was 
absolute and unconditional it must be given full effect 
and could not be varied by parol evidence introduced 
to show that the plaintiff intended to reserve whatever 
rights she had against a joint tortfeasor. The defendant 
there had excepted to the admission of parol evidence 
as to what was said to the plaintiff by the attorney in 
whose presence the release was signed and as to her 
intention at the time to reserve a right of action against 
others who might be legally responsible. 
In Reid vs. LowdPn (La. 1939), 189 So. 28G it was 
held that where there was nothing in a written compro-
mise settlement and release to f'how that the plaintiff 
intended to reserve his rights against another tortfrasor 
and there was no ambiguity, parol evidence was not 
admissible to prove the alleged n•S('J'Vation. rrhp Conrt 
.. 
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there stated that since the parties had reduced their 
agreement of settlement and discharge to writing and 
since the writing contained no reservation of rights, the 
plaintiff was bound by the agreement and could not alter 
or change it by parol evidence. 
In Freedman vs. Montagne Associates, Inc. (N.Y. 
J959), 187 N.Y.S. 2d 636 it was held that a release could 
not be varied by parol evidence to show that the plain-
tiff was releasing only his interest in commissions. 
As can be noted from the foregoing cases, the plain-
tiffs cannot, after having settled their claims against the 
em11loyee Gideon Allen by a clear, complete and unam-
biguous instrument, later attempt to vary the clear terms 
of that instrument by parol evidence and change it 
on a default decree from a sow's ear into a silk purse. 
So even if defendant had been made a party to that 
suit, the covenant was and is not subject to reformation 
in the manner attempted by plaintiff. 
POINT IV 
THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE, EVEN AS RE-
FORMED, IS A BAR TO THE PRESENT SUIT. 
Assuming, 'lvithout conceding, that the reformation 
dccn'P were valid and binding on defendant, the CoY-
enallt not to Sue Gideon Allen, even as reformed, would 
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still be a bar to the present suit against his t•mployer, 
under the majority and best-reasoned casPs tliat han 
ruled on the precise issue invoked. 
In Barsh vs. illu.llins (Okla. 1~)59), 338 P.2<l 845, 
the plaintiff had settled with the driver and PXPcuted 
a release and covenant not to sue in which claims were 
expressly reserved as against lWrsons not speeifically 
ref erred to in the release and covenant not to sue. The 
Court there held that, notwithstanding the express reser-
vations, the release and covenant was a bar as to all 
persons and entities ·whose liability was derivative in 
nature. The Court stated: 
" ( 5) If this were a case involving ordinary 
joint tortf easors, each guilty of independent and 
concurring negligence, it is clear that a release 
of this type would not realease those joint tort-
feasors not named. All American Bus lines vs. 
Saxon, 197 Okl. 395, 172 P. 2d 424. In such cases 
primary considera6on is given to the intent of the 
person executing the release. If, howe·ver~ tlw 
claimed liabilitv of defrndants for the negligent 
acts of Hall and Barsh Produce Co. is derivatiw 
in nature, a different rnle is applicable. 
"In Ford Motor Co. vs. Tomlinson, G Cir., 229 
F.2d 873, 877, the court pointed ont t.hat .under 
Ohio law an injured p<:>rson could ordrnanl)~ n'-
lc~ase one joint tortfrasor and lat<>r recover frolll 
the remaining tortfrasors if the right to do so "-a~ 
Pxpressl)- n's<:·n·pd in the> r0l('nse. Bnt the court 
further said: 
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' ... in Ohio the release of a tort-feasor 
primarily liable ordinarily operates to re-
lease one secondarily liable, regardless of an 
attempt to reserve rights against the latter. 
Hillyer vs. City of East Cleveland 1951 155 
Ohio S~. 552, 99 N.E. 2d 772. See' Terr~ vs. 
Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 6 Cir., 1955, 
222 F. 2d 652 .... ' 
"In one of the cited cases, Terry vs. Memphis 
8tone & Gravel Co., the court used the following 
language (222 F. 2d G53): 
'Appellant, for a substantial and valu-
able com;ideration, signed a covenant not to 
sue the truck o-wner, Sullivan, or the truck 
driver, Hyatt. Inasmuch as the liablity 
alleged against the appellee company rested 
solely upon the averment that the truck 
driver was the servant or agent of the 
appellee company for whose negligence it 
would be responsible upon the principle of 
respondeat superior, a covenant not to sue 
the truck owner and the driver - appellee's 
alleged agents - would necessarily release 
appellee. The case is clearly distinguishable 
from those cases in which a covenant not to 
sue one joint tort-feasor does not protect 
another joint tort-feasor from an action for 
damages brought against it by an injured 
part)'.' 
''In Giles vs. Smith, 80 A. App. 540, 56 S.E. 
2d SGO, 8G2, the conrt said: 
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'\Vh~re the liability, if any, of the master 
to a tlurd person is purely derivative and de-
pendent en~irely npon the principle of respon .. 
deat supenor, and although not teclmicalh a 
joint-tortf easor, the master may be st;ed 
almw or jointly with the servant on tlw 
merits (and by analogy, a release of tlw 
servant from liability, 35 Am. J ur. 9G3, 5;~±) 
will bar an action against the master, where 
the injury and damages are the same.' 
''\Ve have rec-0gnized and applied the rules 
hereinabove announced. In Mid-Continent Pipe-
line Company vs. Crauthers, Okl., 2G7 P.2d 568, 
571, the plaintiff executed a release and covenant 
not to sue in favor of defendant's agents for a 
consideration of $300. Therein, as in the case 
before us, the release expressly reserved a right 
of action against any other persons who might 
have caused or assisted in causing plaintiff's 
damage. 
* * * 
"We held that the release of the agent rel(,ased 
the principal and revt>rsed ·with directions to 
enter judgment for def Pndant. 
The Court held that th<> defendant's liahilit~-, if an), 
was derivative in nature, an<l <'Onclnded: 
"It therefore follows that the release of those 
who were guilty of the primary negligenc(~ cxtin-
.. t " gnislws t11e liahility of th<> otlwr conspim .ors. 
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Barch vs. J.l1idlins, siipra, held that the master is 
not a joint tort-feasor, and that a release of the servant, 
whatever the intent or attempted reservation, of neces-
::;ity rdeases the master. 
In Willi.ams vs. M arionucaux (La. 1960), 124 So. 
2d 91!J, the Lonisiana Supreme Court in a well-reasoned 
opinion held that an employer was released by a covenant 
not to ime executed between his employee and the injured 
party, notwithstanding an express reservation of rights 
as to the employer contained in the CO\'enant. This 
was a suit for injuries caused by a pipe, protruding from 
a passing logging truck. The employer, Marionneaux, 
filed a third party complaint against its employee, 
Blanchard, claiming indemnity for any loss it might sus-
tain as a result of the employee's primary negligence. 
Blanchard then filed a third party complaint back against 
plaintiff Williams, pleading the covenant not to sue 
obtained by him from the plaintiff and thus completing 
the circle. 
Tho court there found that the master's liability 
was based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
that he therefore conld not be considered a joint tort-
f <·asor and that his liability was secondary to and de-' . 
]H:•nd<'nt upon that of the servant. 
The> court reasoned as follows: 
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"Since Marionneaux had the ri <rht to n•co111, ±. b rom Blanchard 1Yhatever damages he might han 
been obliged to pay plaintiff for injmies resultin" 
from Blanrhard's negligence wltilt1 the lattvr wa~ 
acting in furthcram·c> of his duties as .:\Iarion-
' 
1 tl t" . nL•unx::; Plll]J10~-l1 <', tl' q1ws 1011 arises a:s to tlH· 
legal effect prodnc<'d hy the cornprorni:s<~ and 
settlement by plaintiff of his claim against 
Blanchard, in which he con•nanted to indemnifr 
and save Blanchard harmless for all claims an;! 
demands for damage::; gTo\ring out of the accident. 
This release, in our view, not only operated to 
discharge Blanchard as the party primarily 
responsible; it effected a complete relea:se of 
:Marionneaux, who was only secondaril~' liable. 
And this, despite the attempted reservation by 
plaintiff in the release of all his rights against 
Marionneaux and his liability insurer." 
* * * 
"Now, when Blanchard compromised with plain-
tiff, he repaired his wrong and, therefore, w~~s 
fully acquitted from further liability. Tlm 
acquittance inun•d to the benefit of 1\Iarionneanx 
for the rt>lease of the tort-feasor must he held to 
release Marionneaux also from further responsi-
bility, as his liabilit~- for tlrn tortions act 1ra~ 
Yicarious in nature and derived sole l~- from lm 
legal n·lation to the wrongdoer. 
"To cive lq:;-al pffret to tl1c~ l"'f·wrrntion 
containect in tlw relc~ase, a:s plaintiff would har(' 
ns do wonld lll'odnce conspq1wnees of' a most 
'] t f' · t11·:tl-l """l'Cl1.l"r th·1t till' nnscern \' 11a nre - 01, no 1 ::il<-' •r-. < 
tort-fra;or has already r•·paire<1 th<' wron,l;' 
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conformably with Article 2315, Marionneaux 
would be entitled to reimbursement from Blan-
chard, as t~ie party primarily responsible, and 
Blanchard, m turn, would be entitled to indemni-
fication from plaintiff as he contractually agreed 
to save Blanchard and his insurer harmless for 
all claims and demands for damages on account 
of the accidPnt." 124 So. 2d 921-923. 
A similar result 1rns reached in a case involving an 
attempted reservation of rights against a municipality 
incident to execution of a covenant not to sue the pri-
mary, or active, tort-feasor, in Lee v. City of Baton 
Rouge (La. 1962), 1±1 So. 2d 125. The court there care-
fully distinguished between the liability of joint tort-
feasors and that of a passively-negligent governmental 
entity and concluded that such attempted express reser-
vation of rights against the governmental entity was 
ineffective. It stated: 
"As counsel for defendants have aptly put it, '\Ve 
would have an endless circle of legal futility. 
"In addition to the above argument that 
allowing plaintiff to proceed with this su~t. would 
only result in an endless circle of legal futility, we 
find many authorities holding that release of the 
primary obligor also disch~r~es the secondary 
o bligor because this result is mescapable under 
the laws of subrogation. It is elementary that 
where the claimant sues only the party second-
arily liable he is then snbrogated to the rights of 
the .claimant and lPgally stands in his shoes. He 
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has all of the rights, but is also subject to all of 
the limitations of the surbrogator." 141 So 2d 125 
133. . , 
The rule of the above cases also applies in surety. 
ship law. Slatoff vs. Theitrich (N.J. 1938), 199 A. 4g, 
123 N. J. Eq. 593. 
As noted in the foregoing cases, the injustice of 
permitting the injured person's claim to be indirectly 
asserted against the employee through the employer is 
just as much present in cases of an attempted reserva-
tion as in cases where no reservation is attempted. So 
in addition to the advantages of a logical and consistent 
application of the respondeat superior doctrine, the rule 
releasing the employer under the present facts also 
avoids the double exposure of the employee to liability 
with its attendant expense, circuity of action and multi-
plicity of suits. 
In this case, if reformation of the original covenant 
is permitted, and the reservation therein held to be effec-
tive any loss incurred bv Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. after ' . . 
execution of the release by Gideon Allen would entitle 
it to be reimbursed from its employee, Gideon Allen, 
for all sums it was required to pay. Gideon Allen, in 
turn could then maintain a claim back to the plaintiff 
' 
for breach of the covenant given to him. The rnle mak-
ing the covenant not to sue• a bar, despite an atternptr.d 
reservation as to the emplo:·er, logically prevents tlus 
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"circle of futility" from occurring and preserves to the 
employee the peace for which he paid $10,000 to plain-
tiff. By the covenant plaintiff promised and agreed 
''never to make any demand or claim, or commence or 
cause or permit to be prosecuted any action at law or in 
equity, or any proceeding of any description against 
Gideon Allen." Yet by pnrsuing his claim against Abbott 
GM Diesel, Inc., Gideon Allen will be subject to further 
liability contrary to the covenant provisions. 
In the lower court plaintiff relied upon two New 
York lower court cases which upheld a reservation of 
rights in covenants not to sue against persons liable 
only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The 
case of Wilson v. Econom (1968) 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288 
NYS 2d 381, involved a malpractice action against an 
attorney. In one sentence the court without explanation 
or citation to authority found a reservation of rights 
against all other parties except the attorney himself 
was valid. 
The second case, Wilson v. City of New York (1954) 
131 NYS 2d 47, involved a private citizen who sued 
New York City for an alleged assault upon him by a 
police officer. The Supreme Court for Kings County, 
trial term, in its opinion did not discuss the problem of 
circuity of action and multiplicity of suits inherent in 
allowing the action against the master after release of 
th(_• servant. 
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The California case of Ellis v. Jewett Rhoades Motor 
Company (1939), 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 84 P.2d 791, a 
case cited in the Wilson case sitpra, and also extensiveh 
quoted by plaintiff in the lov\'er court brief (H. 41-±2.! 
is distinguishable from tht• present case because th~re 
the particular covenant not to sue given to the employee 
for consideration did not by its terms protect him from 
a subsequent indemnity rlaim hy the employer. Tl1e 
court there stated: 
"In the instant case Jewett, knowing he might 
in the future be compelled to meet a demand for 
reimbursement by appellant, agreed that respond-
ent should retain his right to proceed against 
appellant." 
The court in Ellis, supra, distinguished an Ohio case, 
Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 52G, 
on the basis that the intention of the persons receiving 
the covenant not to sue in Bello was that they would 
not further be subject to a suit by the city on an in-
demnity theory. 
A second case, Braum v. Town of Louisburg, 12° 
N.C. 701, 36 S.E. 166, 78 Am. St. Rep. 677, was also 
distinguished by the court in Ellis on the basis that the 
covenant given there protected the employee both directly 
and indirectly from future exposure. rrhe Brown ca~e 
was explained as follows: 
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'_'The court held that Ponton (the party 
paymg) must be protected in his right under the 
contract, and he could not be protected if the city 
of Louisburg were called to recover from him 
whatever damages it might be compelled to pav 
plaintiff. Such an effect would be a complet~ 
d<'strnction of his right under his contract with 
plaintiff." 84 P.2d 791, 793. 
rrhe ruling in Ellis, supra, \VOuld be harsh unless 
the employee or agent paying for a covenant not to sue 
expressly and unequivocally agrees and understands that 
his attempt to "buy his peace" may be rendered a nullity 
8hould his employer be further held responsible and 
then comes back against him. The covenant not to sue 
given to Gideon Allen purports to settle completely his 
exposure regarding the accident in question in the fol-
lowing language: 
"I do hereby covenant and agree ... never to 
make any demand or claim, or commence or cause 
or permit to be prosecuted any action at law or 
in equity, or any proceeding of any descriz:tion, 
agciinst Gideon Allen (for injuries ... sustamed) 
... in consequence of an accident that occurred on 
or about the 6th day of December, 1968, at or near 
Lehi, Utah. 
"I understand that the parties to whom this 
<'ovenant extends admit no liability of any sort 
hy reason of said accident and that the payment 
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above recited is made to terminate f 11rthcr contro-
l:ersy respecting all claims for damar;es that I 
have heretofore asserted or that I or my personal 
represeutafri;es might hereafter assert agai11st 
Gideon Allen bcc(mse of said accident.'' (H 3~-33). 
(Emphasis a( ldPd.) 
The foregoing provisions are inconsistt•nt with aml 
contradictory to the parn.grnph added in tlw decn'(' of 
reformation which 1nuport(•d to n'Sl'l'\'(' as agaillst tliP 
defendant in the present suit and would, if valid, suhj0ct 
the employee to further liability to the employ0r, con-
trary to the provisions of the COYPnant quoted above. 
The Federal case of Bacon, ct al. v. United States, 
321 Fed. 2d 880 (8th Cir., 1963), involved a similar prob-
lem of interpreting an ambiguous covenant not to sue. 
In that case an action was brought against the Unikd 
States under the Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained 
in a collision in Missouri between an antomohile owned 
by the plaintiffs and an automobile o-wned by the United 
States and driven by one of its employees. The employ<<' 
and his personal insurer settled with the plaintiffs and 
received a covenant not to sne, ·which speeificall.'; l'('-
served the plaintiffs' claim for the damage dmw to 
their automohik as a result of tl1« accident and spPeifie-
alh- resen-ed all cbims against tl1t• Unit<>d States. Tn 
a snhsequent suit aguinst tlte 1~nit(•d Stat<·~, t11e GoYent-
ment pleaded that it was rd<.'US<'d lJ~· virtne of the eoY-
t•nant, n otwi thstandi ng· tlw re:3r•rya ti on. Both t!w frdnal 
district conrt and the• Stli C'1re11it n~1 c'~·<l tlint th» eO\·-
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enant not to sue was contradictory by its own terms, 
presumably because the master, if sued, could claim 
indemnity back against the employee and indirectly re-
sult in further liability to the employee. The court found 
that the instrument, regardless of the attempted reser-
vation of rightt::> against others, completely released the 
government from any liahilit~r to tlw plaintiff. 
Another case relied upon by plaintiff in the lower 
court is United States v. First Security Bank, 208 F.2d 
424 (10th Cir. 1953). That case involved a suit com-
menced in the Central District of Utah against the 
United States under the Federal T'ort Claims Act for 
injuries sustained when Mardis, a mail carrier, allegedly 
retarded the speed of his automobile causing the driver 
following him to jack-knife a house trailer he was towing 
into the opposite lane and against an approaching car . 
. Judge Ritter entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and 
that judgment was sustained on appeal. 
The Court of appeals there, however, noted that 
under the· provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2676 the U.S. Govern-
ment had no right of indemnity or subrogation against 
the employee, a significant distinction from the present 
case. The court there then erroneously concluded that 
an employer and his employee although not joint tort-
f easors "in the sense that their joint acts caused an 
injury" are nevertheless jointly and severally liable and 
that the "law of joint tortfeasors relating to releases 
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and covenants not to sue is ap1Jlicabk'." Such a concln-
tion fails to recognize the basic nature of the employer-
employee relationship as explained in the cases ahon. 
This Court in Salt Lake City v. Sclmbach, supra, an-
nounced the law of Utah with regard to the relationship 
between one whose negligence is active and another 
whose negligence is passive or secondarv: 
"Notwithstanding the city's liability to the 
public, it was under no duty to notify appellant 
of a condition of appellant's own creation. It was 
not a wrongdoer as between itself and appellant. 
The city and appellant were not in p:ari delicto; 
they were not joint tortfeasors. (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
In reaching its decision, the Federal Court over-
looked the Schitbach case and believing this Court had 
not ruled on the issue, that it was free to make its own 
interpretation as to Utah law. That erroneous interpre-
tation is not binding on this Court. 
Further it vv'ill be noted that two other Federal 
Circuit Courts have ruled on the· effect of a covenant 
not to sue with reservation against the United States 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, t>ach with a 
different holding than that in the First Security Ea11k 
case. The case of Bacon vs. United States, ;:.:,upra, by 
the 8th Circuit ten years after the First Security Bauk 
case, found that under 1\lissonri law a con'nant not to 
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sue given to an employee also relt>ased the United States, 
even though a specific rt>servation was contained in the 
covrnant. Plaintiffs argued that 37 R.S. Mo. ~ 537.060 
(,T.A.M.S., 1949 Ed.) provided (as does Utah) that a 
coYPnant not to sue a joint tortfrasor may <•xprPssl>· 
reserv<> plaintiff's tlairn again::;t othPr joint tortfrasors. 
The court, howevC>r, ado1itPd the general rnle that where 
the master can be held liahle only under the theory of 
respondeat superior, he is not a joint tortfeasor. The 
court reasoned that when the s0rvant is released, the 
master for whom he was acting at the time should also 
be released. The court referred to the First Security 
Bank case, sitpra, but declined to adopt its ruling that 
"the law of joint tortfeasors relating to releases and 
covenants was applicable to respondeat superior situa-
tions." 
The Federal case of Munson vs. United States, 380 
F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1967), was brought under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act against the United States as a result 
of an automobile accident involving a Government em-
ployee. The employee settled separately with the plain-
tiff, and received a covenant not to sue specifically 
reserving to the plaintiff a cans<~ of action against the 
United States. A Motion by the United States for Sum-
mary .JudgmPnt was granted by the lower court, con-
strning Ohio law. On appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed, 
hut did so on the ground that suits agajnst the United 
~tates did not involve the nsnal employee-employer sit-
nation. 
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The court there acknowleged the distinction between 
cases involving joint tortfeasors and cases involvin" 
b 
derivative liability: 
" ... the authorities on the subject emphasize 
that the reason for such a rule was to protect the 
normal right of indemnity which the master holds 
by subrogation to any judgment rendered him in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
* * * 
"In the case of a settlement with the servant, 
no indication of the servant's liability is given and 
there is no reason to release the master except 
to protect him from having to bear the full burden 
of plaintiff's remedy when his rights against the 
servant are destroyed." 
The court in Mimson concluded that, because the 
United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Gil-
man, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S. Ct. 695, 98 L. Ed. 898 (1954), 
had specifically held the :B,ederal Tort Claims Act did 
not place the Federal Government in the shoes of a 
common law employer, it did not therefore have the 
common law right of indemnity against a negligent em-
ployee normally accorded any emplo>·er whose negli-
gence is purely vicarious and the reason for construing 
the covenant to release the United States from liability 
had ceased to exist. That rationale should not he applied 
where, as here, the right of indemnit>· of tlw Prnployer 
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Abbott GM Diesel still exists in full force. The M wnson 
case reinforces the general rule by noting the distinctions 
which apply in claims under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. 
As pointed out in the foregoing discussion, the First 
Security Bank case erroneously interprets the rule which 
should apply under the facts of the present case. It is 
not binding as precedent on this Court. The better rule, 
as outlined in the cases cited above, releases the em-
ployer where a covenant not to sue is executed in favor 
of the employee, whether or not there is an attempted 
reservation as against the employer. This is especially 
so where as here, the language of the covenant, as sup-
posedly reformed, is inconsistent and contradictory and 
leaves the employee open to further liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff in 
favor of the employee, Gideon Allen, for consideration 
operates as a release of the employer, Abbott GM Diesel, 
Inc. The attempt by plaintiff to reform the covenant 
to include an express reservation as against the defend-
ant in this action can have no effect where, as here, the 
direct and substantial interest of defendant was known 
to plaintiff at the time the reformation snit was filed 
hut defendant was not joined as a party. In any event 
the covenant was not snbjt'Ct to reformation in the man-
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ner attempted by plaintiff. Finally, even if the covenant 
as reformed, were binding in this action, which defendant 
does not concede, it would, nevertheless, operate as a 
release of the defendant under the better reasoned case8, 
which represent the majority view. This Court should 
enter its order directing the entry of summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
and Reed L. Martineau 
Seventh Floor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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